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Abstract: In this paper, we present a probabilistic adaptation of an As-
sume/Guarantee contract formalism. For the sake of generality, we assume
that the extended state machines used in the contracts and implementations
define sets of runs on a given set of variables, that compose by intersection over
the common variables. In order to enable probabilistic reasoning, we consider
that the contracts dictate how certain input variables will behave, being either
non-deterministic, or probabilistic; the introduction of probabilistic variables
leading us to tune the notions of implementation, refinement and composition.
As shown in the report, this probabilistic adaptation of the Assume/Guarantee
contract theory preserves compositionality and therefore allows modular relia-
bility analysis, either with a top-down or a bottom-up approach.
Key-words: Assume/Guarantee Reasoning, Contracts, Probabilistic reason-
ing, Reliability analysis.
Un mode`le de raisonnement probabiliste base´
sur les contrats Assume/Guarantee
Re´sume´ : Ce document pre´sente une adaptation probabiliste d’un formalisme
de contrats Assume/Guarantee. On supposera, dans le but d’eˆtre le plus ge´ne´ral
possible, que les machines tats tendues utilise´es pour les contrats et imple´mentations
de´finissent des ensembles d’histoires sur un ensemble de variables donn, et
qu’elles se composent par intersection sur les variables communes. Pour permettre
un raisonnement probabiliste, on conside`re que les contrats pre´cisent le comportement
des variables d’entre´es, non-de´terministes ou probabilistes. Le fait de conside´rer
des entre´es probabilistes ne´cessite une adaptation des notions d’imple´mentation,
composition et raffinement. Ce rapport montre que cette adaptation probabiliste
de la the´orie des contrats Assume/Guarantee pre´serve la compositionalite´, et
permet de ce fait une analyse de fiabilite´ modulaire, que ce soit par une approche
ascendante ou descendante.
Mots-cle´s : Raisonnement Assume/Guarantee, Contrats, Raisonnement
probabiliste, Analyse de fiabilite´.
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1 Introduction
Several industrial sectors involving complex embedded systems have recently ex-
perienced deep changes in their organization, aerospace and automotive being
the most prominent examples. In the past, they were organized around ver-
tically integrated companies, supporting in-house design activities. These sec-
tors have now evolved into more specialized, horizontally structured companies:
equipment suppliers and OEMs. OEMs perform system design and integration
by importing/reusing entire subsystems provided by equipment suppliers. As a
consequence, part of the design load has been moved from OEMs to suppliers.
An inconvenient of this change is the increased occurrence of late error discovery,
system level design errors uncovered at integration time. This is particularly
true for system reliability, for state of the art reliability analysis techniques are
not modular [HR94, SA96].
A corrective action, taken in the last decade is that the OEMs now focus
on the part of the system design at the core of their business, and as far as
possible, rely on industry-wide standard platforms. This has an impact on
design methods and modeling formalisms: Virtual prototyping, design space
exploration are required early in the design cycle. Component based design has
emerged as the most promising technique to address the challenges resulting
from this new organization of the industry.
However, little has been done regarding the capture of reliability require-
ments, their formalization in behavioural models and the verification techniques
capable of analyzing in a modular way the reliability aspects of a system, at an
early stage of design. The paper contributes to solve these issues: The seman-
tics foundations presented in this paper consists in a mathematical formalism
designed to support a component based design methodology and to offer mod-
ular and scalable reliability analysis techniques. At its basis, the mathematical
formalism is a language theoretic abstraction of systems behaviour. This ba-
sic formalism can be instantiated to cover several aspects, including functional,
timeliness, hybrid and reliability [BCP07]. This report presents the reliability
aspect.
The central concept of the formalism is the notion of contract, built on top
of a basic behavioural formalism. Contracts allow to distinguish hypotheses on
a component from hypotheses made on its environment. Contracts are central
to component based design methodologies.
This paper focuses on developing a compositional theory of probabilistic
contracts, capable of capturing reliability aspects of components and systems.
The key contributions are the definition of probabilistic satisfaction, composition
and refinement relations that ensure that they will be compositional.
The paper is organized as follows: In the first section we present the As-
sume/Guarantee formalism upon which we built our probabilistic theory. In the
second section we formally define the probabilistic Assume/Guarantee theory
we developed and we prove that it is compositional. In a third section we com-
pare our work to classical related formalisms like pCTL and pCTL∗ [ASBSV95,
HJ89], or developed more recently, such as Dynamic Fault Trees [BCS07] and
Arcade [BCH+08].
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2 Classical Assume/Guarantee Reasoning
The model we have built is based upon the notion of components and As-
sume/Guarantee reasoning. In this section, we will define the background upon
which the report is based. In a first subsection we will give the definitions we
used for contracts and implementations. Then we will present the basic opera-
tions already existing on contracts and the main theorems we want to preserve
in our probabilistic adaptation.
2.1 Contracts and Implementations
In order to define contracts and implementations, we need to consider the ab-
stract notion of “assertion”.
Definition 1 An assertion E = S :: σ possesses a set of ports and variables
(its signature, σ) through which it interacts with its environment. S is identified
with the set of runs it defines or accepts, each run assigning a history for each
variable and port. If necessary, the inverse projection of E = S :: σ on σ′ ⊇ σ
will be denoted by E ↑σ
′
.
We assume that there exists a complementation operator for an assertion E,
relative to its signature σ. It is denoted by ¬E. Assertions compose by inter-
section over the common sets of ports and variables (assuming the appropriate
inverse projections have been performed to equalize the involved signatures).
We will denote products either by E1 × E2 or E1 ∩E2 equivalently.
E1 × E2 = E1 ∩ E2 = S1 ↑
σ ∩S2 ↑
σ:: σ, with σ = σ1 supσ2
With these notations and definitions, we will be able to define implementa-
tions and contracts.
Definition 2 An implementation is an assertion, i.e. a set of runs with a given
signature.
We will use the symbol M = SM :: σM to refer to implementations. They
are ordered by inclusion over the runs they contain (one more time assuming
that the appropriate inverse projections have been performed). We will say
that an implementation M refines an implementation M ′ with respect to the
signature σ, written M σ M ′, if and only if SM ⊆σ SM ′ , i.e. SM ↑σ⊆ SM ′ ↑σ.
Composition preserves implementation refinement.
Definition 3 A contract C :: σ is a pair of assertions (A :: σA, G :: σG) with
σ ⊇ σA ∪ σG.
 A is the assumption;
 G is the guarantee, i.e. the promised behavior, under the hypothesis that
A holds.
Note that for a contract C :: σ = (A :: σA, G :: σG), we can consider the
equivalent contract C′ :: σ = (A ↑σ:: σ,G ↑σ:: σ). Whenever convenient, we
will thus suppose that both assertions of a contract C have the same signature
INRIA
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and we will denote respectively the assumption, the guarantee and the common
signature of C by AC , GC and σC .
The following definition of satisfaction will precise the interpretation we
make of a contract.
Definition 4 An implementation M satisfies a contract C :: σC = (AC , GC)
(written M |= C) if and only if
M ∩AC ⊆
σC GC
Satisfaction can be checked using equivalent formulas:
M |= C ⇐⇒ M ⊆ GC ∪ ¬AC ⇐⇒ M ∩ (AC ∩ ¬GC) = ∅
From these equivalent definitions, we can show that there exists a unique
maximal implementation MC satisfying a contract C:
MC = (GC ∪ ¬AC) :: σC
This maximal implementation is to be interpreted as the implication A⇒ C.
We can prove that an implementation M satisfies contract C = (AC , GC) if
and only if it satisfies the equivalent contract (AC ,MC), and if and only if
M σC MC . We will say that a contract C :: σ = (A :: σA, G :: σG) is in
canonical form when G = MC , or equivalently when ¬A ⊆ G or G ⊆ ¬A,
and σ = σA = σG. As the canonical form of a contract is unique and the
satisfaction of the contract equivalent to the satisfaction of its canonical form,
we will consider only contracts in canonical form in the rest of this document.
2.2 Operations on Contracts
The notion of composition of contracts formalizes how contracts attached to
different components of a system should be combined in order to represent one
single component. If C1 :: σ1 = (A1, G1) and C2 :: σ2 = (A2, G2) are two con-
tracts defined as in the previous section, their composition should respect some
rules. First, their promises should be composed, as we want to guarantee that
both G1 and G2 must be respected. Remember that composition is the intersec-
tion of the two assertions, after computing the appropriate inverse projections
in order to equalize the sets of variables and ports.
Regarding the assumptions, we also want to assume that both A1 and A2 are
respected, but we must consider the case when the second contract guarantees
that part of the assumption of the first one is respected and vice-versa. A run
satisfying the assumption of the composition should consequently either satisfy
both A1 and A2 or be made unacceptable by the composition of the guarantees.
Thus the following definition:
Definition 5 Let C1 :: σ1 = (A1, G1) and C2 :: σ2 = (A2, G2) be contracts, we
define C1 ‖ C2 to be the contract C :: σ = (A,G) such that:
 σ = σ1 ∪ σ2;
 A = (A1 ↑σ ∩A2 ↑σ) ∪ ¬(G1 ↑σ ∩G2 ↑σ);
 G = G1 ↑σ ∩G2 ↑σ.
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Remark that the so defined contract is in canonical form.
With the above definition, we can prove that the composition preserves the
implementation relation.
Lemma 1 If M1 |= C1 and M2 |= C2 then M1 ×M2 |= C1 ‖ C2.
Proof :
As the two contracts are supposed in canonical form, we have Mi ⊆σi Gi. Thus
M1 ×M2 ⊆σ1∪σ2 G1 ∩G2, and M1 ×M2 |= C1 ∩ C2.

Next, we will need to build a refinement relation. Intuitively, this relation
must be compatible with the composition operation and the implementation
relation. We will thus say that a contract C refines another contract C′ if it
assumes less and guarantees more:
Definition 6 The contract C :: σ = (A,G) refines the contract C′ :: σ′ =
(A′, G′), written C  C′, if and only if σ ⊆ σ′, A ⊇σ
′
A′ and G ⊆σ
′
G′.
We can now prove the following properties (the proof is quite straightforward
and left to the reader):
Lemma 2 If M is an implementation, C1, C2, C3 and C4 four contracts,
1. If M |= C1 and C1  C2, then M |= C2.
2. If C1  C2 and C3  C4 then C1 ‖ C3  C2 ‖ C4.
3 Extension to Probabilistic Approach
In this section we will adapt the definitions presented above in order to be able
to express probabilistic properties, like reliability, while preserving composition-
ality.
What we want to express is the affirmation “This particular implementa-
tion M satisfies the given contract C with level α”, meaning that given the
information of the contract C, we can prove that the (probabilistic) measure
of the runs of M that do not satisfy the contract C (i.e. that are within the
assumptions but outside of the guarantees) is not above 1− α. More precisely,
we still want to consider non-probabilistic assertions, but we want to be able
to express that the environment may induce randomness in our assertions. We
must therefore precise which of the variables/ports associated to the contract
are controlled (internal variables for instance) or uncontrolled (controlled by
the environment). We can then choose a subset of the uncontrolled ports to
be subject to probability distributions. There will then remain a subset of the
uncontrolled ports that we will consider non-deterministic. As a consequence,
the signature of each assertion will be divided into two disjoint sets of ports,
controlled or uncontrolled σ = u ⊎ c (note that for a contract, there will only
be one such signature).
INRIA
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3.1 Probabilistic Contracts, Implementations and Satis-
faction
Definition 7 A probabilistic contract is a tuple C = (C,p,P) with
 C = (u, c, A,G) a non-probabilistic contract;
 p ⊆ u a set of uncontrolled ports;
 P a probability distribution over the set of all histories of p.
Note that the probability distribution is attached to the contract itself and
not to the implementation. We can therefore give our contract to a supplier
saying “Knowing that the histories of the ports of p will follow this distribution,
can you build an implementation ensuring that 90% of the runs will satisfy the
contract?”. Let’s now formally define this probabilistic satisfaction relation:
Definition 8 An implementationM satisfies probabilistic contract C = (C,p,P)
with level β (written M |=β C) iff uM ⊆ uC , cM = cC and
M(M ⊆ GC) ≥ β
N.B.: We still consider that C is in canonical form.
The predicateM ⊆ GC is a reference to the set of all histories of the ports in
p that ensure the induced behaviors of the implementation M (i.e. the inverse
projection on the set of runs of M) is included in the guaranteed behaviors,
whatever other non-deterministic choices have been made. Formally: If ω is one
possible history of the ports in p, we call Ω the set of all such histories,
M(M ⊆ GC) = P({ω ∈ Ω | {w} ∩M ⊆
σC GC})
This means that we measure the set of histories of p that ensure that the runs
of M will be included in the guaranteed behavior, whatever non-deterministic
choices are. Finally, M |=β C means that the probability that M |= C w.r.t.
the distribution of histories on the probabilistic ports is higher than β, whatever
non-deterministic choices are.
3.2 Probabilistic Composition
The probabilistic point of view makes it more complicated to compose contracts.
As the distributions on the probabilistic ports are linked to the contracts, what
we absolutely do not want is to compose two contracts whose probabilistic ports
overlap. Moreover we also want to avoid the case where a probabilistic port for
the first contract is controlled by the second one (i.e. the first considers an
input port as probabilistic, but this port is an output of the second). In order
to keep a quite simple definition, and because we think this is not too major a
restriction, we will only define the composition of two contracts when they have
compatible sets of controlled/uncontrolled ports (i.e. c1 ∩ c2 = ∅). Thus the
following definition:
Definition 9 If C1 and C2 are 2 probabilistic contracts, their parallel composi-
tion C1 ‖ C2 is defined if and only if
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1. C1 ‖ C2 is defined (i.e. c1 ∩ c2 = ∅);
2. p1 and p2 are disjoint sets of uncontrolled ports in C1 ‖ C2 (i.e. ports
that are neither controlled by C1 or C2).
Then we have
C1 ‖ C2 = (C,p,P) with


C = C1 ‖ C2
p = p1 ⊎ p2
P = P1 × P2
The above definition makes it impossible to compose two contracts whose
probabilistic and controlled ports overlap. This could be seen as a major re-
striction but there is a way to make such contracts compatible. Consider two
probabilistic contracts C1 and C2, and suppose that the port x is controlled
by C1, but considered as probabilistic by C2. If we want to compose C1 and
C2, we have to make the port x non-probabilistic in C2. Thus we consider the
contracts C′2 = (C2,p2 \ {x},P
′
2) and Cx = (Cx, {xp},P
x
2). P
′
2 is the restriction
of P2 without x, P
x
2 is the probability distribution considering only x, and Cx
is a non-probabilistic contract we will call a wrapper, with three uncontrolled
ports (xp, xc and s) and one controlled port x. This wrapper selects with a
non-deterministic port s ∈ {p, c} the value that will be given to x between the
probabilistic one and the one given by C1. Composing C′2 with Cx thus enables
us to compose it with C1 (renaming x to xc). This is illustrated in Fig.1, where
thick triangles denote probabilistic ports. The wrong version is on the top and
the correct wrapped one is on the bottom.
x
x
xp
xc
s
C1
Cx
C
′
2
x
C1
x
C2
Figure 1: Illustrating the wrapper mechanism
We now prove that the composition is compatible with the satisfaction re-
lation. The proof of this theorem relies on the fact that the probabilistic ports
of contracts C1 and C2 are disjoint.
Theorem 1 If C1 and C2 are 2 probabilistic contracts that can be composed, M1
and M2 2 implementations such that Mi |=βi Ci for i = 1, 2 then
M1 ×M2 |=β1·β2 C1 ‖ C2.
INRIA
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Proof :
The intuition behind this proof is to show that separate histories on the ports
p1 and p2, each ensuring that its particular implementation behaves correctly,
also ensure that the composition of the implementations will behave correctly.
In short, the product of two correct histories is correct w.r.t. the composition
of the contracts and implementations. This will be true because every “correct”
history satisfies the corresponding contract whatever non-deterministic choices
are.
Let’s consider histories w1 and w2, respectively on the sets p1 and p2, such
that Mi ∩ {wi} ⊆σi Gi.
As we said before, composition is by intersection over the common ports and
variables. We therefore begin with the inverse projection over the set of variables
we want to consider, and then intersect the runs.
It is clear that ∀w, {w}∩M1∩M2 ⊆σ {w}∩M1, with σ = σ1∪σ2 (assuming
the inverse projections are correctly done on both sides). Moreover, {w1×w2}∩σ
Mi ⊆σ {wj} ∩σ Mi, whatever i or j. As a consequence:
{w1 × w2} ∩M1 ∩M2 ⊆σ {w1 × w2} ∩M1
⊆σ {w1} ∩M1 ⊆σ G1
{w1 × w2} ∩M1 ∩M2 ⊆σ {w1 × w2} ∩M2
⊆σ {w2} ∩M2 ⊆σ G2
⇒ {w1 × w2} ∩M1 ∩M2 ⊆
σ G1 ∩G2
As a consequence, {wi} ∩Mi ⊆σi Gi implies that
{w1 × w2} ∩M1 ∩M2 ⊆
σ1∪σ2 G1 ∩G2
And finally
P({w | {w} ∩M1 ∩M2 ⊆
σ1∪σ2 G1 ∩G2}) ≥ β1 · β2
Thus P(M1 ∩M2 ⊆ C1 ‖ C2) ≥ β1 · β2.

Note that we cannot find a better bound that β1 ·β2, because if the contracts
are independent (σ1 ∩ σ2 = ∅), we clearly have
M((M1 ×M2) ⊆
σ1∪σ2 (GC1 ∩GC2)) =M(M1 ⊆
σ1 GC1) · M(M2 ⊆
σ2 GC2)
3.3 Probabilistic Refinement
As we want the probabilistic refinement relation to be compatible with com-
position and satisfaction (and with the non-probabilistic relation), there is not
much liberty in the way we can define it. Let’s say that a contract C1 refines a
contract C2 (written C1  C2). In order to be compatible with the composition,
the probabilistic ports of C1 must be a subset of those of C2, and the distribution
on these ports must be the same for C1 and C2. Moreover we want this relation
to be compatible with implementation, which means that if an implementation
satisfies C1 with level α, it must satisfy C2 with a level β that can be computed
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from α. The idea for this is to measure the inclusion of the guarantees of C1 in
the guarantees of C2, and to use this measure in order to compute β.
Definition 10 If C1 = (C1,p1,P1) and C2 = (C2,p2,P2) are two probabilistic
contracts, we say that C1 refines C2 with level γ (C1 γ C2) if and only if
1. σ1 ⊆ σ2;
2. p1 ⊆ p2 and P1 is the marginal of P2 over p1;
3. P2({ω} ⊆σ2 G2|{ω} ⊆σ2 G1) ≥ γ, whatever non-deterministic choices are.
γ is a measure of the inclusion of G1 in G2, γ = 1 meaning that G1 ⊆ G2
almost all the time.
As the definition for the refinement relation was built to be compatible with
implementation, it is quite logical to prove the following theorem, which says
that if an implementation satisfies a probabilistic contract with level β, and
if this contracts refines a second one with level γ, then the implementation
satisfies the second contract with level β · γ. This should enable us to use
simpler contracts in order to prove satisfaction.
Theorem 2 If C1 = (C1,p1,P1) and C2 = (C2,p2,P2) are 2 probabilistic con-
tracts and M an implementation, then
M |=β C1 and C1 γ C2 ⇒M |=β·γ C2.
Proof :
Because of the definition of the probabilistic refinement, this result is quite clear:
P2(M |= C2) = P2({w | {w} ∩M ⊆
σ2 G2})
And
P2({w | {w} ∩M ⊆σ2 G2}) ≥
P2({w | {w} ∩M ⊆σ2 G1}) · P2({w} ⊆σ2 G2 \ {w} ⊆σ2 G1)
And as P1 is the marginal of P2 over p1,
P2(M |= C2) ≥ β · γ

Once again, we cannot find a finer bound because if G2 ⊆σ2 G1, we have
P2(M |= C2) = β · γ.
3.4 Problems with finer satisfaction relations
The satisfaction relation we chose above is adapted to reliability analysis. It
measures the runs of the implementations that have the right behaviour whatever
non-deterministic choices are. Consequently one could wonder whether it would
be of interest to try finer satisfaction relations, for example existential or even
finer, checking every state the system goes through.
These finer relations have been studied and ruled out of our work because
they cannot be compositional for the following reasons:
INRIA
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f2f3f1
y
b
a
x
C2C1
Figure 2: Global System
• An existential relation would allow us to say that “in 90% of the runs,
there exist a way in which the environment can force our implementation
to stay within the bounds of the guarantees”. This would be contrary to
the principle of re-use, where we want to be sure that whatever the user
asks of the component, it behaves safely.
• An even finer satisfaction relation that would check every state the system
goes through would be quite convenient in order to express disponibility
properties. This kind of satisfaction relation would ponderate each infinite
history of the probabilistic ports with the “amount” of visited states that
ensure the guarantees. This would mean, for example, that for a particular
history on the probabilistic ports, the induced behavior will stay within
the guarantees with a probability at least α, whatever non-deterministic
choices are. But knowing this probability is not enough to ensure com-
positionality, because if we compose two contracts, the induced behaviour
for a fixed history of the probabilistic ports must satisfy both contracts at
the same time.
3.5 Example
Let’s assume we want to build a system with 2 input ports a and b, 1 output
port y. We want this system to avoid a state where y is true and a is false. We
know there are possibly different sources of failure f1, f2 and f3 but we suppose
for the moment that f3 will never happen. We decide to split the system into
2 subsystems (Fig. 2). We will ask a first supplier to build the first subsystem
as a component satisfying a contract C1, and to a second supplier, we give a
contract C2.
The first supplier will then provide us with an implementation M1 sat-
isfying C1 with a level α (Fig. 3(a)), and the second will give us an im-
plementation M2 satisfying C2 with a level β (Fig. 3(b)). Once we have
these components, we know that their composition will satisfy the contract
C = C1 ‖ C2 = (never(f3), never(f3)⇒ never(¬a∧y)), with a level α·β (Fig. 4).
Now consider the case when we discover that f3 may in fact happen. The
contract C is not realistic anymore, as it supposes that f3 never happens. In
consequence, we want to know how our components will satisfy a contract C′ =
(⊤, never(¬a ∧ y)). Instead of trying to find a new decomposition into different
subcontracts, we just have to compute the level of refinement γ such that C γ
C′. We will then know that M1 ‖ M2 |=αβγ C′. This probability γ may be
written as follows:
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C1 = (never(f3), never(f3)⇒ never(φ))
with φ = ¬a ∧ x
M1 |=α C1
f3f1
b
a
x
x = (a ∨ f1 ∨ f3) ∧ b
α = P(never(f1))
(a) M1
C2 = (⊤, always(y = x))
with φ = ¬a ∧ x
M2 |=β C2
f2
x
a
y
y = if φ then f2 else x
β = P(never(f2))
(b) M2
Figure 3: Subcomponents
C = C1 ‖ C2 = (never(f3), never(f3)⇒ never(¬a ∧ y))
M1 ‖M2 |=α·β C
f2f3f1
y
y = if φ then f2 else x
b
x = (a ∨ f1 ∨ f3) ∧ b
a
x
Figure 4: Composition of the implementations
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γ = P(never(¬a ∧ y)|never(f3)⇒ never(¬a ∧ y))
4 Related work
The problem of reliability analysis is widely present in the literature. Several
attempts have been presented in the domain of probabilistic model checking in
order to express probabilistic properties and check whether a particular system
satisfies them. pCTL and pCTL∗, for example, can be used to specify prop-
erties such as reliability and performance [HJ89, ASBSV95]. There even exist
extensions of pCTL and pCTL∗ in which the probabilistic behaviour coexist
with non-determinism [BdA95]. However, in these formalisms, the probabilistic
point of view is inherent to the system checked. Consequently, compositionality
is not an issue for them. Our formalism, on the contrary, considers probabili-
ties as an assumption on the environment. In this way, we only consider open
systems for which probabilities and non-determinism comes from the environ-
ment. In this way, compositionality can be proved and used in order to obtain
a modular analysis.
On the other hand, compositional reliability analysis tools and formalisms
have already been developed in the literature, such as Arcade [BCH+08] or
Dynamic Fault Trees [BCS07] for example. These formalisms present compo-
sitional reliability analysis as it is actually done in the industry, that is to say
without any behavioural interpretation. Our approach is different. We want
to be able to reason on the behaviours of components, and not only on their
failure probability. Of course our formalism captures such classical analysis,
but it allows much more because the satisfaction relation is strongly linked to
the behaviour of the implementations. Moreover, as our formalism allows as-
sumptions on the environment, it can capture situations where two separate
implementations do not satisfy their respective contracts, but their composition
satisfies the composition of the contracts because of the assumptions on the
environment, which would not be possible with a classical reliability analysis.
Finally, the probabilistic refinement relation we have built does not have an
equivalent in the classical reliability analysis. It allows to compute the prob-
abilistic satisfaction of a contract while only considering information on the
probabilistic satisfaction of another contract and on the relations between these
contracts.
5 Conclusion and further work
In this paper, we have presented a compositional theory of probabilistic con-
tracts, capable of capturing reliability aspects of components and systems. This
theory enables a behavioural interpretation of reliability, which was not the case
in the existing compositional formalisms.
There are several natural directions to continue this work.
First, what we present here is a very general theory with few direct applica-
tions. Computing the satisfaction and refinement probabilities efficiently would
require to narrow the field of applications. In practice, assertions and machines
will be deterministic open transition systems and never sets of run. We are
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actually developing a more practical approach where contracts are Markov De-
cision Processes and implementations open transition systems. In this approach,
computing the satisfaction and refinement probabilities relies on the existence
of pure optimal strategies in mean-payoff Markov Decision Processes [Gim07].
Finally, the same kind of probabilistic point of view could be adapted to
contracts residuation [Rac08], which would give a practical way to build (canon-
ical?) implementations from the residuation of the guarantees of a contract by
its assumptions.
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